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NOTES 
THE (POSSIBLY) INJURED CONSUMER: 
STANDING IN DATA BREACH LITIGATION 
LAUREN M. LOZADA† 
INTRODUCTION 
Equifax, Deloitte, Yahoo, Pizza Hut, Uber, FedEx, 
MyFitnessPal, Reddit, T-Mobile, British Airways, Facebook, 
Google+, and now Marriott Hotels.  Other than being household 
names, what do these companies have in common?  Within the 
last three years, all have suffered significant data breaches,1 
leaving their consumers vulnerable to identity theft.  According 
to an ongoing study, 944 breach incidents occurred in the first 
half of 2018 alone.2  These breaches compromised a total of 
3,533,172,708 consumer data records—over eighteen million 
records every day.3  “Today’s organizations face a cybersecurity 
landscape more difficult to navigate than ever before.  As our 
world grows more interconnected and technology-dependent, 
cybercriminals are becoming more sophisticated in their attacks 
and are keeping pace with our efforts to thwart them.”4  These 
frequent attacks raise an important question—what are 
consumers to do after a breach has occurred, and should the 
breached companies be forced to bear the consequences of 
hackers’ actions? 
 
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2020, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.S., Hofstra University, 2010. 
1 The Most Infamous Data Breaches, TECHWORLD (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.techworld. com/security/uks-most-infamous-data-breaches-3604586/. 
2 Data Privacy and New Regulations Take Center Stage, Breach Level Index: 
2018 First Half Review, GEMALTO 2 (Oct. 16, 2018), https://breachlevelindex.com/ 
request-report [hereinafter Breach Level Index]. 
3 Id. at 2. This represents a 72% increase over the same period in 2017. Id. at 4. 
4 Data Breach Industry Forecast 2018, EXPERIAN DATA BREACH RESOLUTION 2, 
http://www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/white-papers/2018-experian-data-
breach-industry-forecast.pdf (last visited June 24, 2019). 
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Many consumers, unable to determine hackers’ identities, 
seek instead to bring legal action against the companies that 
failed to safeguard their data.  For the consumer who has 
experienced some form of identity theft—for example, fraudulent 
charges on her accounts or unauthorized accounts created in her 
name—the path to the courtroom is relatively straightforward.  
For those whose data has not (yet) been misused, however, the 
requirement of constitutional standing presents a significant 
obstacle.  Article III of the United States Constitution limits 
judicial power to the adjudication of “[c]ases” or “[c]ontroversies” 
between parties.5  Under current case law, in order to 
successfully establish standing, a plaintiff must allege: 
(1) it has suffered an “injury-in-fact” that is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.6 
In the context of a data breach where no actual, concrete injury 
has yet occurred—that is, identity theft—the question becomes 
whether any future harm is in fact “imminent.”  In the midst of 
an existing circuit split on what qualifies as “imminent,” the 
United States Supreme Court in its 2013 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l 
USA decision explained that a sufficiently “imminent” injury is 
one that is “certainly impending” or, at a minimum, poses a 
“substantial risk” of future harm.7  This explanation,8 however, 
did little to reconcile the circuit split, and inconsistent results in 
such cases have continued. 
This Note will address the question of what factors a 
prospective plaintiff must display to “push [a] threatened injury 
of future identity theft beyond the speculative to the sufficiently 
imminent.”9  Part I will delve into relevant statistics to identify 
the characteristics of a data breach that most often lead to 
eventual identity theft.  Part II will explore recent data breach 
standing cases and analyze the factual differences and legal 
 
5 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1. 
6 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
180–81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
7 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013). 
8 Notably, the Clapper decision was unrelated to consumer data breaches, see 
id. at 401, and the Supreme Court has yet to decide a standing case in this 
particular context. 
9 Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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perspectives that have led to disparate results among the federal 
circuits.  Lastly, Part III will recommend a method for evaluating 
future data breach standing issues. 
I. BACKGROUND ON DATA BREACHES 
The Identity Theft Resource Center (“ITRC”) defines a data 
breach as “an incident in which an individual name plus a Social 
Security number, driver’s license number, medical record or 
financial record (credit/debit cards included) is potentially put at 
risk because of exposure.”10  Since 2005, the company has been 
tracking security breaches in order to identify patterns and 
trends that could help consumers and businesses better protect 
personal identifying information.11  Much of the ITRC’s 
methodology and findings center around one concept: “data 
breaches are not all alike.”12  When attempting to determine the 
magnitude and likelihood of the potential harm associated with a 
breach, several factors should be taken into account: (1) the 
source of the breach; (2) the type(s) of data compromised; and 
(3) the industry in which the breached company operates.13 
A. Breaches by Source 
Because the ITRC recognizes method of exposure as a 
“critical category” in evaluating the future harm stemming from 
a breach, it divides cyberattacks into seven categories: “hacking 
(with subcategories of phishing, ransomware/malware, and 
skimming), unauthorized access,14 insider theft, data on the 
move, accidental exposure, employee error/negligence/improper 
disposal/loss, and physical theft.”15  Since 2011, hacking has been 
the most common type of attack, increasing annually from 
approximately 25–30% of the total breaches in 2011 to an 
overwhelming 59.4% in 2017.16 
 
10 2017 Annual Data Breach Year-End Review, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE 
CENTER 19 (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/2017-data-breaches/ 
[hereinafter ITRC Data Breach Report]. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. at 19–20; see also Breach Level Index, supra note 2, at 6–11. 
14 The ITRC defines unauthorized access as “breaches which involve some kind 
of access to the data but the publicly available breach notification letters do not 
explicitly include the term hacking.” ITRC Data Breach Report, supra note 10, at 4. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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Cybersecurity company Gemalto’s Breach Level Index 
employs a similar methodology, dividing breaches into the 
categories of malicious outsider, accidental loss,  
malicious insider, hacktivist,17 and unknown.18  Malicious 
outsider—arguably the most analogous to the ITRC’s hacking 
category—again consistently represents the most prevalent type 
of breach.19  Of the 3.35 billion records reportedly compromised in 
the first half of 2018, nearly 2.5 billion, or 73%, were the result of 
attacks by malicious outsiders.20  Accidental loss, encompassing 
mistakes and misconfigurations, was the second most prevalent 
source of breaches in the first half of 2018, accounting for 34% of 
breach incidents and 26%—nearly 880 million—of total 
compromised records.21  Notably, the number of records 
compromised by accidental loss was cut nearly in half compared 
to the same period in 2017.22  Whether this reduction was by 
chance or due to a concerted effort by companies to better 
safeguard consumers’ data remains to be determined. 
In response to the ever-increasing frequency of data 
breaches, Congress has considered enacting national legislation 
that would require companies to notify affected individuals of a 
breach.23  To that end, Congress tasked the Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) with evaluating the extent to 
 
17 Oxford Dictionaries defines the term “hacktivist” as “[a] person who gains 
unauthorized access to computer files or networks in order to further social or 
political ends.” Hacktivist, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxford 
dictionaries.com/definition/hacktivist (last visited June 24, 2019). 
18 Breach Level Index, supra note 2, at 6. 
19 Id. at 7. According to the Breach Level Index, malicious outsider breaches 
accounted for 56% of the total breach incidents in the first half of 2018. Id. 
20 Id. at 6. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: 
DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; 
HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN (2007) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Most 
states have already enacted breach notification laws, but due to the variability 
among state statutes, companies that possess data from consumers in multiple 
states have been forced to invest time and money into developing custom notification 
schemes, or to adhere to the strictest of the applicable state laws. Brandon Faulkner, 
Note, Hacking Into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1105, 1110 
(2007). For more information on the various state breach notification laws, including 
an interactive map, see Summary of U.S. State Data Breach Notification Statutes, 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, https://www.dwt.com/gcp/state-data-breach-statutes 
(last visited June 24, 2019). 
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which data breaches have resulted in identity theft.24  A 
summary of the GAO’s findings is as follows: 
The extent to which data breaches result in identity theft is not 
well known, in large part because it can be difficult to 
determine the source of the data used to commit identity theft.  
Although we identified several cases where breaches reportedly 
have resulted in identity theft—that is, account fraud or 
unauthorized creation of new accounts—available data and 
interviews with researchers, law enforcement officials, and 
industry representatives indicated that most breaches have not 
resulted in detected incidents of identity theft.25 
The GAO did recognize, however, that the potential harm 
stemming from a breach is largely dependent on its 
circumstances, including how the data was compromised.26  
“[B]reaches that are the result of intentional acts,” it explained, 
“[are generally] considered to pose more risk than accidental 
breaches.”27  Of the twenty-four breaches examined by the GAO,28 
four resulted in known cases of identity theft.29  All four of these 
breaches were from intentional acts; three involved  hacking, 
leading to account fraud, and one involved using deception or 
misrepresentation to obtain personal data, leading to the 
unauthorized creation of new accounts.30  Notably, the theft of a  
 
 
 
 
24 GAO Report, supra note 23, at 3. The stated objectives of the report were to 
examine: “(1) what is known about the incidence and circumstances of breaches of 
sensitive personal information; (2) what information exists on the extent to which 
breaches of sensitive personal information have resulted in identity theft; and (3) the 
potential benefits, costs, and challenges associated with breach notification 
requirements.” Id. 
25 Id. at 5. 
26 Id. at 6. 
27 Id. 
28 The GAO analyzed lists of breaches maintained by Identity Theft Resource 
Center, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and Congressional Research Service to 
identify the twenty-four largest data breaches reported in the news media from 
January 2000 to June 2005. Id. at 24, 26. The authors of the report acknowledge 
that breaches involving criminal activity may consequently be overrepresented, “as 
such breaches are probably more likely than accidental losses to be reported to 
authorities and by the news media.” Id. at 20. 
29 Id. at 24. “The term ‘identity theft’ is broad and encompasses many types of 
criminal activities, including fraud on existing accounts—such as unauthorized use 
of a stolen credit card number—or fraudulent creation of new accounts—such as 
using stolen data to open a credit card account in someone else’s name.” Id. at 2. 
30 GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 26. 
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laptop containing personal information presents a grey area with 
respect to intent, as it may be unclear whether the laptop was 
stolen for the hardware, the personal data, or both.31 
B. Breaches by Type of Data Compromised 
The GAO further determined that “[t]he type of data 
compromised in a breach can effectively determine the potential 
harm that can result.”32  It explained that “[d]epending on the 
type of information compromised and how it is misused, identity 
theft victims can face a range of potential harm, from the 
inconvenience of having a credit card reissued to substantial 
financial losses and damaged credit ratings.”33  This is assuming, 
of course, that unauthorized individuals obtain the information 
in a usable, or unencrypted, format.34 
According to law enforcement officials, the ease with which 
credit and debit card numbers can be misused makes fraudulent 
charges on existing accounts the most prevalent type of harm 
resulting from a breach.35  The ITRC reported that in 2017, credit 
and debit card information was involved in nearly 20% of breach 
incidents, impacting over 14 million data records.36  This 
represents an increase of 88% compared to the number of records 
reported in 2016.37 
While breaches compromising credit and debit card 
information pose a significant problem, the resulting harm is 
somewhat mitigated by the existence of laws limiting consumer 
liability in the event of fraud.  By federal statute, consumer 
liability for unauthorized credit card charges is capped at a 
 
31 Id. at 31. 
32 Id. at 30. 
33 Id. at 2; see also Allison Grace Johansen, 7 Steps to Take Right After a Data 
Breach, LIFELOCK, https://www.lifelock.com/learn-data-breaches-steps-to-take-right-
after-a-data-breach.html (last visited June 24, 2019) (“While stolen credit cards and 
the like can be canceled and replaced, it’s quite difficult to obtain a new Social 
Security number. And fraudsters can do a lot more with your SSN . . . and other 
unique, sensitive PII than they can accomplish with an email or credit card 
account.”). 
34 ITRC Data Breach Report, supra note 10, at 19; see also GAO REPORT, supra 
note 23, at 31 (defining encryption as “encoding data so that it can only be read by 
authorized individuals,” and explaining that “encryption does not necessarily 
preclude fraudulent use of data—for example, if the key used to unencrypt the data 
is also compromised.”). 
35 GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 22. 
36 ITRC Data Breach Report, supra note 10, at 11. 
37 Id. at 4–5. 
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maximum of fifty dollars per account.38  Similarly, the Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act limits consumer liability for unauthorized 
debit card transactions, depending on how quickly the loss or 
theft of the card is reported.39  Some credit and debit card issuers 
even go so far as to adopt a policy to reimburse all fraudulent 
charges incurred on users’ accounts.40  Consumers are then left 
with the relatively minor inconveniences of cancelling and 
reactivating cards, losing temporary access to account funds, and 
redirecting automatic payments and deposits.41 
The unauthorized creation of new accounts, by contrast, may 
result in severe, long-term financial and other hardships.42   
Depending on the type of data obtained, an identity can be used, 
among other things, to open bank or credit card accounts, file tax 
returns, originate home mortgages, or apply for government 
benefits.43  Because the unauthorized creation of new accounts 
generally requires the use of one or more forms of personally 
identifiable information44—typically including social security 
numbers—it is more difficult and labor intensive to achieve than 
fraud on existing accounts.45  Consequently, it is believed to occur 
much less frequently from data breaches.46  In fact, officials at 
the Secret Service, FBI, and USPIS47 agree that the data needed 
 
38 GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 30 n.47 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2012)). 
39 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (2012)). 
40 Id. at 30. 
41 Id. at 30 n.47. 
42 Id. at 30. 
43 Id.; see also Alison Grace Johansen, 5 Kinds of ID Theft Using a Social 
Security Number, LIFELOCK, https://www.lifelock.com/learn-identity-theft-resources-
kinds-of-id-theft-using-social-security-number.html (last visited June 24, 2019) 
(indicating that data thieves can potentially use social security numbers to 
effectuate financial identity theft, government identity theft, criminal identity 
theft—essentially using another’s identity as a “get out of jail free” card—medical 
identity theft, and utility fraud). 
44 The GAO Report defines “personally identifiable information” as “any 
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity—such as 
name, Social Security number, driver’s license number, and mother’s maiden 
name—because such information generally may be used to establish new 
accounts . . . .” GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 2 n.2. Notably, the definition does not 
extend to “other ‘means of identification,’ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(7), including 
account information such as credit or debit card numbers.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
1028(d)(7) (2012)). 
45 Id. at 22. 
46 Id. 
47 The USPIS is a division of the U.S. Postal Service responsible for 
investigating postal-related crimes such as mail fraud, external mail theft, and 
fraudulent changes of address. Id. at 12–13. 
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to create such new accounts is more often obtained through other 
means, such as sifting through household trash, than from data 
breaches.48 
The ITRC has found that social security numbers, used by 
many institutions as primary authenticators, are compromised in 
breaches even more often than credit or debit card numbers.49  In 
2017, more than half of the total reported incidents included 
social security numbers—an astonishing 158 million records 
exposed.50  Still, “[w]hile a Social Security number continues to 
be the most valuable piece of information in the hands of a thief, 
even the exposure of emails, passwords or user names can be 
problematic as this information often plays a role in hacking and 
phishing attacks.”51 
C. Breaches by Industry 
Because different industries deal primarily with certain 
types and quantities of data, some industries will be more 
heavily impacted by data breaches than others.52  For example, 
retail stores are known to handle a large volume of credit and 
debit card numbers and are thus particularly attractive targets 
for a breach.53  The ITRC found that the business  
sector—encompassing such entities as retail services, utilities, 
payment processors, and hospitality—experienced 55% of the 
total breach incidents in 2017.54  Breaches in this sector were 
more impactful than those in other sectors, making up 99% of the 
total records compromised.55 
This represents about 188,000 records compromised per 
breach, as compared to an average of about 22,000 per breach for 
all other industries.56  Hacking was the cause of nearly 40% of 
 
48 Id. at 22. 
49 ITRC Data Breach Report, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
50 Id. at 5. 
51 Id. (quoting Karen Barney, ITRC Director of Program Support). 
52 See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 20. 
53 See id. 
54 ITRC Data Breach Report, supra note 10, at 6, 20. A more complete list of 
entities in the business category includes “retail services, hospitality and tourism, 
professional, trade, transportation, utilities, payment processors and other entities 
not included in the other four sectors. It also includes nonprofit organizations, 
industry associations, non-government social service providers, as well as life 
insurance companies and insurance brokers (non-medical).” Id. at 20. 
55 Id. at 6. 
56 See id., as calculated from the data presented. 
2019] THE (POSSIBLY) INJURED CONSUMER 469 
Business sector breaches.57  The second most impacted industry 
was the “Medical/Healthcare” sector, making up approximately 
24% of breaches.58  The remaining 21% of breaches were divided 
between the “Banking/Credit/Financial,” “Government/Military,” 
and Education sectors.59 
D. Statistical Challenges 
As its title suggests, the GAO’s report acknowledges that we 
do not yet understand the full extent to which data breaches 
result in identity theft.60  Although the report was published in 
2007, the same challenges still exist in determining the link 
between data breaches and eventual misuse.  Many victims of 
identity theft have no knowledge of how their personal 
information was compromised and, as a result, may misattribute 
suspicious activity on their accounts or credit report.61  For 
example, a consumer who has previously been notified of a 
breach may incorrectly assume that the breach was the cause of 
a recent fraudulent charge.62  Moreover, once a consumer’s data 
has been compromised, there is no telling how long after the 
breach a malicious party may choose to misuse his or her data.63  
“[S]tudies that attempt to measure the harm resulting from data 
breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.”64  Lastly, 
issues of privacy and confidentiality can impede the collection of 
meaningful data from both breached companies and injured 
consumers.65  The implementation of data protection regulations, 
however, has already led to an increase in the number of 
reported breaches.66  With more information available to evaluate 
the risk associated with particular types of breaches, it may 
become possible to predict which breaches are most likely to 
result in eventual identity theft. 
 
57 Id. at 4. 
58 Id. at 6. 
59 Id. 
60 GAO Report, supra note 23, at 5. 
61 Id. at 28. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 29. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Breach Level Index, supra note 2, at 3; see also ITRC Data Breach Report, 
supra note 10, at 3 (quoting Eva Velasquez, President and CEO of the ITRC) (“We’ve 
seen the number of identified breaches increase as a result of industries moving 
toward more transparency, . . .”). 
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II. CASE LAW 
A. The “Certainly Impending” and “Substantial Risk” 
Standards of Review 
In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, the Supreme Court was 
tasked with determining whether an alleged future injury was 
sufficiently imminent to confer standing.  The case was brought 
by a group of individuals whose professions required them to 
“engage in sensitive and sometimes privileged telephone and 
email communications” with others located abroad.67  They 
sought to challenge a federal statute that permitted government 
surveillance of foreign citizens because, in their belief, “there 
[was] an objectively reasonable likelihood that their 
communications [would] be acquired under [the statute] at some 
point in the future.”68  Because the plaintiffs failed to allege that 
any of their communications had yet been monitored, the 
Supreme Court denied standing.69  Alluding to several of its prior 
standing decisions, the court explained: 
“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, 
it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure 
that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III 
purposes—that the injury is certainly impending . . . .”  Thus, 
we have repeatedly reiterated that “threatened injury must be 
certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,” and that 
“allegations of possible future injury” are not sufficient.70 
The Court also discussed the “highly attenuated chain of 
possibilities”71 that would need to occur before plaintiffs would be 
surveilled, including the government’s decision to monitor 
specific communications, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court’s approval to target the plaintiffs’ foreign contacts, and 
finally, the plaintiffs’ own participation in the intercepted 
communications.72  The Court explained that it “decline[d] to 
abandon [its] usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that 
rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.”73 
 
67 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 406 (2013). 
68 Id. at 407. 
69 Id. at 410–11. 
70 Id. at 409 (internal citations and alterations omitted) (first quoting Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992); then quoting Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
71 Id. at 410. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 414. 
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The Supreme Court did, however, leave room for a more 
forgiving standard to be applied.  The Court explained in footnote 
5 of the decision: 
Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that it is literally certain that the harms they identify will come 
about.  In some instances, we have found standing based on a 
“substantial risk” that the harm will occur, which may prompt 
plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that 
harm.74 
It remains unclear whether the Supreme Court intended for the 
substantial risk analysis to apply in the particular context of 
consumer data breach actions.  This has led to inconsistency in 
the standard applied, and to divergent views among circuit 
courts as to what exactly a plaintiff must demonstrate at the 
pleadings stage to establish standing. 
B. Factors to Consider in Weighing the Imminence of  
 Future Harm 
While no bright-line rule exists for determining whether a 
consumer plaintiff has sufficiently established standing in a data 
breach action, a small set of common factual details have 
permeated circuit courts’ analyses in recent cases.  These factors 
include: (1) the presence or absence of actual misuse of consumer 
data as a result of the breach; (2) the type of data compromised in 
the breach; (3) offers by breached companies to provide free 
credit monitoring services to effected consumers; and 
(4) mitigation costs expended by the plaintiff consumer(s).75  
Though frequently taken into account, these factors have not 
always been interpreted consistently by the courts. 
1. Prior Misuse 
At its most basic, the concept of prior misuse of consumer 
data would concern only the plaintiffs named in the particular 
action.  If a plaintiff experienced misuse, the court would confer 
standing; if not, the court would deny it.  When the focus shifts to 
evaluating the imminence of future harm, however, prior misuse 
can play another role in the analysis.  Any prior misuse of data 
stolen in the subject breach, whether belonging to a named 
 
74 Id. at 414 n.5 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 
180 (2010) (Stevens, J. dissenting)). 
75 See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274–77 (collecting cases). 
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plaintiff or not, speaks to the intent of the hackers in possession 
of the consumers’ data.76  Even one instance of a hacker making a 
fraudulent charge or attempting to open an unauthorized account 
shows that he or she has the requisite scienter to commit fraud.  
It also shows that the hackers were successful in acquiring 
enough of the right types of personal data to be able to steal 
consumers’ identities.77  Both of these inferences lead to an 
increased likelihood that additional consumers will experience 
future misuse and may justify consumers in seeking recovery for 
any preventative measures that they undertake.  On the other 
end of the spectrum, if a breach cannot be shown to have resulted 
in any instances of attempted identity theft at all, it is not 
unreasonable to infer that consumers may never experience 
misuse of their data.78 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Zappos.com, Inc. aptly 
illustrates this point.  Popular retailer Zappos.com fell victim to a 
breach of its servers, compromising the personal data of more 
than 24 million customers.79  In the class action suit that 
followed, predicated on an increased risk of identity theft, the 
district court divided the plaintiffs into two groups—(1) those 
who had suffered harm from actual misuse, and (2) those who 
had not.80  The court found that this distinction was dispositive, 
conferring standing on Group 1, but denying it from Group 2.81  
The plaintiffs in Group 2 then appealed the dismissal of their 
claims.82  The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding standing for all 
plaintiffs.83  In so holding, the court recognized that, while the 
plaintiffs whose data had been misused were not part of the 
 
76 See id. at 274 (discussing and ultimately distinguishing from cases in which 
alleged misuse of plaintiffs’ personal information indicated that the thief 
“intentionally targeted” the breached data). 
77 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
78 See Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (“ ‘[A]s the breaches fade further into the past,’ the 
Plaintiffs’ threatened injuries become more and more speculative.”) (quoting 
Chambliss v. Carefirst, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 564, 570 (D. Md. 2016)); see also In re 
Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958 (D. Nev. 2015) (“[T]he passage of time 
without a single report from Plaintiffs that they in fact suffered the harm they fear 
must mean something.”). 
79 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018). 
80 Id. at 1024. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1027. Much of the court’s discussion concerned whether its earlier 
decision in Krottner remained good law in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
Clapper decision. Id. at 1025–26. It concluded that “Krottner is not clearly 
irreconcilable with Clapper and thus remains binding.” Id. at 1026, 1026 n.6. 
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appeal, “their alleged harm undermine[d] Zappos’s assertion that 
the data stolen in the breach [could not] be used for fraud or 
identity theft.”84 
Similarly, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, the 
Seventh Circuit found standing where prior misuse had 
occurred.85  Hackers had used malware to infiltrate the computer 
systems of luxury department store Neiman Marcus.86  Of the 
approximately 350,000 credit card numbers compromised in the 
cyberattack, 9,200 credit cards “were known to have been used 
fraudulently” after the breach.87  The customers sought to recover 
from Neiman Marcus under such theories as negligence and 
breach of implied contract.88  They alleged, among other things, 
“two imminent injuries: an increased risk of future fraudulent 
charges and greater susceptibility to identity theft.”89  In 
conferring standing on all plaintiffs in the class action suit, the 
court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ risk of harm was substantial 
given that “[p]resumably, the purpose of [a] hack is, sooner or 
later, to make fraudulent charges or assume . . . consumers’ 
identities.”90  “Why else,” the court asked, “would hackers break 
into a store’s database and steal consumers’ private 
information?”91  It is not difficult to see why the court presumed  
 
 
84 Id. at 1027. 
85 794 F.3d 688, 688–90, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). 
86 Id. at 689. 
87 Id. at 690. 
88 Id. at 690. The complaint also alleged unjust enrichment, unfair and 
deceptive business practices, invasion of privacy, and violation of multiple state data 
breach laws based on an array of injuries classified by the plaintiffs as either 
“actual” or “imminent.” Id. at 690–92. 
89 Id. at 692. In addition to those noted above, plaintiffs claimed to have suffered 
the “actual” injuries of: 
1) lost time and money resolving the fraudulent charges, 2) lost time and 
money protecting themselves against future identity theft, 3) the financial 
loss of buying items at Neiman Marcus that they would not have purchased 
had they known of the store’s careless approach to cybersecurity, and 4) 
lost control over the value of their personal information. 
Id. With respect to the first two injuries, while recognizing that “[m]itigation 
expenses do not qualify as actual injuries where the harm is not imminent,” the 
court held that the harm here was imminent, and so the mitigation costs were 
sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 694 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 
U.S. 398, 417 (2013)). The court, however, expressed doubt as to the last two “actual” 
injuries, noting “[w]e need not decide whether they would have sufficed for standing 
on their own, but we are dubious.” Id. 
90 Id. at 693. 
91 Id. 
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that the hackers were acting with malicious intent, in light of 
their prior misuse of thousands of consumers’ credit card 
information. 
In contrast, courts have declined to confer standing where no 
evidence exists to suggest that hackers intend to misuse 
consumers’ data.  For example, in Katz v. Pershing, LLC, the 
plaintiff alleged that her personal data might conceivably be 
misused someday because it was inadequately protected.92  Katz 
did not, however, point to any instance of a breach, let alone 
actual misuse of her personal data.93  Consequently, the First 
Circuit found that “[s]uch a purely theoretical possibility simply 
d[id] not rise to the level of a reasonably impending threat.”94 
Likewise, in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., there was no evidence 
that the hacker so much as “read, copied, or understood” the 
information in the system.95  Plaintiffs alleged that their risk of 
future identity theft had been increased, but the Third Circuit 
determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their 
allegation of future identity theft rested on an attenuated chain 
of assumptions and was not certainly impending.96  In so holding, 
the court cited to one of its earlier decisions, reasoning that “one 
cannot describe how the [plaintiffs] will be injured without 
beginning the explanation with the word ‘if.’ ”97  Given the 
absence of any actual or attempted misuse, or evidence that the 
intrusion into the payroll system was “intentional or malicious,” 
there was nothing to suggest that the data had—or ever would 
be—misused.98 
Lastly, in Beck v. McDonald, the Fourth Circuit concluded 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to show 
any evidence that personal information had been accessed or 
 
92 672 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2012). This case arose when the named plaintiff, a 
brokerage accountholder, alleged that her nonpublic information was vulnerable to 
prying eyes because her information was inadequately protected by the defendant’s 
services. Id. Despite the fact that no known breaches had occurred, Katz purchased 
identity theft insurance and credit monitoring services to guard against the 
possibility that her personal information might someday be hacked. Id. at 79. 
93 Id. at 79. 
94 Id. 
95 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011). The case involved a data breach by a hacker 
who had penetrated a firewall in the defendant’s payroll system. 
96 Id. at 42. 
97 Id. at 43 (alteration in original) (quoting Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant 
Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
98 Id. at 43–44. 
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misused by a thief who intended to steal that information.99  
Following the Third Circuit’s Reilly decision, the Beck court 
reasoned that a conclusion of “certainly impending” identity theft 
would rest on the attenuated sequence of assumptions that the 
thieves had stolen the items with the intent to access personal 
information, that they would then specifically select the named 
plaintiffs’ information from among thousands of others, and 
finally that they would succeed in an attempt at identity theft.100  
Without evidence to support these assumptions, the theft of the 
items presented a merely speculative risk of future harm.101 
2. Type of Data Compromised 
As described in Part I.B above, the type of data compromised 
in a breach weighs heavily on the potential harm that can result.  
While rarely discussed at length in court opinions, the outcomes 
of consumer data breach actions likewise appear to be correlated 
to the type of data involved in the particular breach.102  When 
full, unencrypted social security numbers or credit card 
numbers—data known to be the most useful to identity  
thieves—were alleged to have been stolen, courts have recognized 
the severity of the risk to consumers and conferred standing.103 
Conversely, when confronted with breaches involving more 
benign forms of data, courts have shown reluctance to infer a 
substantial risk of harm.  For example, in Beck v. McDonald, the 
Fourth Circuit declined to confer standing after a laptop 
computer from a medical facility was either misplaced or 
stolen.104  The laptop contained the personal information of 
approximately 7,400 patients, including “names, birth dates, the 
 
99 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017). 
100 Id. at 275. 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., Chambliss v. Carefirst, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 564, 571 (D. Md. 2016) 
(collecting cases in which standing was conferred and noting that they consistently 
“either concerned information more easily used in fraudulent transactions or relied 
on factual allegations that the hackers had already misused the stolen data” 
(emphasis added)). 
103 See, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622–23 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(accepting as true at the pleading stage plaintiff’s contention that social security and 
credit card numbers were stolen, despite defendant’s contention that they were not); 
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015) (malware 
compromising 350,000 customer credit cards); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 
1139, 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (stolen laptop containing the social security 
numbers of 97,000 Starbucks employees). 
104 Beck, 848 F.3d at 267. 
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last four digits of social security numbers, and physical 
descriptors (age, race, gender, height, and weight).”105  Despite 
the volume of data stolen, the lack of full social security numbers, 
credit card numbers, or bank account information on the laptop 
would make it difficult for a malicious hacker to successfully 
steal consumers’ identities.106 
3. Offers of Free Credit Monitoring Services 
In an effort to aid consumers in protecting themselves from 
identity theft following a breach, some companies choose to offer 
free credit monitoring services to affected consumers.107  Courts 
have interpreted such offers in two different ways.  The first 
interpretation is that an offer to pay for credit monitoring is an 
admission of sorts by the company that the risk to consumers is 
substantial enough to necessitate protection.108  In Remijas, the 
court explained “[i]t is telling . . . that Neiman Marcus offered 
one year of credit monitoring and identity-theft protection to all 
[potentially affected] customers . . . . It is unlikely that it did so 
because the risk is so ephemeral that it can safely be 
disregarded.”109  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Galaria v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. conferred standing, specifically noting 
that the defendant’s offer of credit monitoring and identity-theft 
protection for one year was evidence that the company believed 
the risk to be substantial.110 
 
105 Id. Contrary to the medical center’s policies and procedures, the laptop used 
to store the patients’ information was unencrypted. After being notified of the 
breach, the plaintiffs—veterans who had received treatment at the facility—began 
“frequently monitor[ing] their credit reports, bank statements, health insurance 
reports, and other similar information, purchas[ed] credit watch services, and 
shift[ed] financial accounts.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
They consequently brought a class action suit, alleging that the defendant’s failure 
to follow encryption policies caused them “embarrassment, inconvenience, 
unfairness, mental distress, and the threat of current and future substantial harm 
from identity theft and other misuse of their [p]ersonal [i]nformation.” Id. 
106 See discussion supra Part I.B; see also Beck, 848 F.3d at 267 (indicating that 
only the last four digits of social security numbers were contained on the stolen 
laptop); id. at 274 n.6 (describing a single plaintiff who had experienced fraudulent 
charges on her credit card, but explaining that she could not attribute those charges 
to the breach in Beck given that there was no credit card information on the stolen 
laptop). 
107 Sarah Schaut, What to Do After a Data Breach, CREDIT KARMA (Dec. 4, 
2018), https://www.creditkarma.com/id-theft/i/what-to-do-after-data-breach/. 
108 See, e.g., Remijas, 794 F.3d at 694. 
109 Id. 
110 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit found Article III 
standing where hackers stole the personal information of 1.1 million of Nationwide’s 
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The second, opposing interpretation is that it would be 
contrary to public policy to penalize companies for their decision 
to come to the aid of their customers.111  For example, the court in 
Beck expressly opposed the presumption that the willingness of a 
defendant to pay for credit monitoring or identity theft services is 
an indicator of the likelihood of future injury.112  The Fourth 
Circuit stated, “[c]ontrary to some of our sister circuits, we 
decline to infer a substantial risk of harm of future identity theft 
from an organization’s offer to provide free credit monitoring 
services to affected individuals.”113  The court explained, as a 
policy matter, that “[t]o adopt such a presumption would surely 
discourage organizations from offering these services to data-
breach victims, lest their extension of goodwill render them 
subject to suit.”114 
4. Mitigation Costs 
In many cases, plaintiffs contend that they have already 
experienced actual harm, despite the absence of any attempted 
misuse of their personal data.115  They argue instead that they 
have standing based on the time and money they have spent to 
protect themselves from possible identity theft.116  Such plaintiffs 
seek recovery for claimed injuries such as time spent reviewing 
the breach, time spent monitoring their account information, 
 
customers by breaking into its computer network. Id. at 385–86. In holding that 
there was a substantial risk of harm, the court pointed to Nationwide's offer of credit 
monitoring and identity-theft protection for one year, stating “[i]ndeed, Nationwide 
seems to recognize the severity of the risk.” Id. at 388. It is unclear, however, how 
much the court relied on this fact in its finding of substantial risk. Notably, the 
court's finding was also predicated on general statistics of increased likelihood of 
harm, which are not typically accepted by other courts. Id. at 386. Furthermore, it is 
possible that the court may have been swayed by additional allegations included in a 
proposed amended complaint—that three unauthorized attempts had been made to 
open accounts in the plaintiff's name. Id. at 389 n.1. 
111 See, e.g., Beck, 848 F.3d at 276. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. The Third Circuit in In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach 
Litigation agreed, holding that a company’s offer “should not be used against it as a 
concession or recognition that the Plaintiffs have suffered injury,” and sharing the 
concern that “such a rule would ‘disincentivize[] companies’” from making gestures 
of good faith in the wake of a breach. 846 F.3d 625, 634 n.12 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(alteration in original). 
115 See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Appellants 
contend that an increased risk of identity theft is itself a harm sufficient to confer 
standing.”). 
116 See, e.g., id. at 44. 
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payments toward outside credit monitoring services, and the 
burden and expense of replacing credit cards.117  The Supreme 
Court has held, however, that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture 
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their 
fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly 
impending.”118  The lower court in Clapper had allowed standing 
when mitigation costs were prompted by a fear of future injury 
that was not “ ‘fanciful, paranoid, or otherwise unreasonable.’ ”119  
The Supreme Court expressly disagreed, explaining that such a 
standard would “water[] down” fundamental Article III standing 
requirements.120  Courts before and after the Clapper decision 
have mirrored the same principle—that standing may not be 
premised on costs willingly incurred to protect against a 
perceived threat of identity theft.121 
In the event of a breach, there is little that a breached 
company can offer outside of monetary damages.  An injunction 
would not serve to protect the consumer from future harm 
because the company is powerless to reclaim the stolen data or 
otherwise curtail its use.  The only adequate remedy would be to 
compensate the consumer for existing or certainly impending 
monetary damage inflicted upon him or her, rather than 
self-inflicted damage. 
III. RECOMMENDATION 
Evaluating constitutional standing in the context of data 
breach litigation presents a unique set of competing policy 
concerns.  On one hand, consumers should have some avenue of 
redress when their data is stolen through no fault of their own.  
On the other, companies that fall victim to a breach are just 
 
117 See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). 
118 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013) (citing Pennsylvania 
v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976) (per curiam); Nat’l Family Planning & 
Reprod. Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
119 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416 (quoting Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 
118, 134 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
120 Id. 
121 See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 
2015) (“Mitigation expenses do not qualify as actual injuries where the harm is not 
imminent.”); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) 
(“That a plaintiff has willingly incurred costs to protect against an alleged increased 
risk of identity theft is not enough to demonstrate a ‘concrete and particularized’ or 
‘actual or imminent’ injury.”); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276–77 (4th Cir. 
2017) (“Simply put, these self-imposed harms cannot confer standing.”). 
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that—victims.  It may not be fair to hold a breached company 
accountable for actions that were taken by third-party hackers.  
Breached companies often suffer their own harm in the wake of 
breach, in that they can lose the trust—and sometimes the 
business—of many of their customers.122  With the 
ever-increasing sophistication of hackers, it is also possible for 
companies to suffer a breach despite making every good faith 
effort to protect their systems.123  Fairness to affected consumers 
must therefore be balanced against fairness to the companies 
experiencing a breach. 
Neither case law nor current legislation provides a bright 
line rule as to which factual scenarios should result in standing 
for the consumers impacted by a breach.  The precedent that does 
exist to date is inconsistent in several areas.  Due to the wide 
array of factual circumstances that can surround a breach, with 
regard to the extent, method, and intent behind the breach, the 
size, industry, and precautions taken by the breached company, 
and information known about injury to other consumers, a bright 
line rule may not be feasible or appropriate.  The remainder of 
this Note will discuss the goals that should guide the formulation 
of an effective method for analyzing standing in data breach 
cases, suggesting one possible solution that seeks to achieve 
these goals. 
A. Balancing Competing Interests 
The most important objective of any proposed solution to 
address consumer standing is to balance the interests of the 
consumer against the interests of the breached company.  An 
effective solution would recognize that companies are rarely the 
culpable party behind a hack, and that consumers typically bring 
suit against the breached company because they are unable to 
identify and seek recovery from the true offender—the hacker.  
Fairness demands a flexible solution that will protect consumers 
 
122 See Herb Weisbaum, The Total Cost of a Data Breach—Including Lost 
Business—Keeps Growing, NBC NEWS (July 30, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.nbc 
news.com/business/consumer/total-cost-data-breach-including-lost-business-keeps-
growing-n895826 (citing 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study: Global Overview, IBM 
SECURITY 1, 7 (July 2018), https://www.ibm.com/ downloads/cas/861MNWN2). 
123 See Herb Weisbaum, Cyber Threats are ‘Mind Blowing,’ Crooks Getting 
Smarter: Report, NBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016, 8:54 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
mach/features/cyber-threats-are-mind-blowing-crooks-getting-smarter-report-
n554176 (discussing the increasing sophistication of hackers and indicating that 
“[c]riminal hackers don’t give up when their attack is unsuccessful”). 
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who entrusted their personal information to a company in good 
faith and who are now vulnerable as a result.  At the same time, 
companies who have made reasonable efforts to secure the data 
in their care, and are essentially victims of a hack, should be 
protected as well. 
An appropriate framework for evaluating standing would 
aim to encourage companies to be proactive about securing the 
data in their possession.  Punishing companies that have done 
everything in their power to prevent a breach by subjecting them 
to litigation would disincentivize such socially desirable action in 
the future.  Ideally, a company should be able to insulate itself 
from liability by making good faith efforts to invest in data 
security for the benefit of its customers.  Companies that do not 
make a good faith effort to protect their systems, on the other 
hand, should be held accountable for their inaction. 
In determining what constitutes good faith action, courts 
must recognize that a company’s ability to implement and 
monitor systems to protect against breaches is dependent on, and 
often limited by, its financial resources.  A small company cannot 
reasonably be expected to implement the same security measures 
as a large institution worth billions of dollars.124  Moreover, the 
degree of protection necessary should increase with the 
sensitivity of the data that the company possesses.  Companies 
charged with safeguarding social security numbers and other 
personally identifiable information125 that could enable hackers 
to open unauthorized accounts in customers’ names should be 
held to the highest standard, since customers stand to lose the 
most from a breach of such information.  Likewise, companies in 
possession of customers’ credit card information should be held to 
a high standard, given the ease with which hackers can misuse 
such data.126  A lower standard should then apply to companies 
holding data that is unlikely to be pursued or misused by 
hackers—for example, telephone numbers.  Because the degree 
and sophistication of breaches is continually evolving, companies 
and courts alike should expect such standards to evolve 
accordingly. 
 
124 See generally Loren F. Selznick & Carolyn LaMacchia, Cybersecurity 
Liability: How Technically Savvy Can We Expect Small Business Owners To Be?, 13 
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 217 (2018). 
125 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
126 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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An effective solution to the determination of standing should 
also consider the position of both parties with respect to 
discovery.  As previously discussed, a plaintiff must allege 
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability at the pleadings 
stage in order to establish standing.  Setting a standard that 
would make it easier for plaintiffs to meet these requirements 
would enable them to further build their case with the benefit of 
full-fledged discovery.  It may also, however, allow cases to reach 
the discovery phase, only to find that insufficient evidence exists 
for the case to survive.  While this trade-off may be beneficial to 
consumers, forcing every breached company to undergo extensive 
discovery would significantly burden both company resources and 
the judicial system.  By the same logic, a standard that would 
limit the quantity of cases reaching the discovery phase would 
benefit companies and promote judicial economy, but may 
prevent many consumers from pursuing the recovery they 
rightfully deserve.  An effective solution would thus enable 
consumers to obtain the information they need to figure out 
whether or not they can—and should—bring suit, without unduly 
burdening breached companies. 
B. Proposed Quadrant Framework for Judicial Analysis 
A potential solution to the issue of standing in data breach 
cases is to allow consumers whose data has been accessed in a 
breach to conduct a limited form of discovery in order to 
determine whether their risk of harm is sufficiently imminent to 
confer standing.127  The scope of such discovery would be limited 
to address the sole question of whether the necessary evidence 
exists to “push [a] threatened injury of future identity theft 
beyond the speculative to the sufficiently imminent.”128  In order 
to minimize the burden and obstacles placed on both plaintiffs 
and defendants in gathering the information necessary to 
 
127 As it currently stands: 
A plaintiff has no right to discovery in opposing a motion to dismiss for lack 
of standing . . . , since [such] a motion . . . involves an examination of the 
face of the complaint, which does not depend upon discovery. In considering 
standing . . . , only the court, not the plaintiff (or defendant), can elicit 
information outside the pleadings. 
Motions To Dismiss, 7 Cyc. of Federal Proc. § 25:11 (3d ed.). The proposed 
framework would establish a middle ground between this current no-discovery rule 
and full discovery, enabling both parties to request information from the other 
pertinent only to standing. 
128 Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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evaluate the sole question of standing, the proposed limited 
discovery would consist of a standardized form to be completed 
by the breached company and plaintiff.129  This would also lessen 
the burden on attorneys and judges by avoiding the full discovery 
process associated with litigation, including drafting case-specific 
requests, creating discovery schedule, and managing discovery 
deadlines.130 
The form itself, which could be made available on a public 
website or be forwarded by the company as part of data breach 
notification requirements, would collect information about the 
company itself, the specific breach, and the company’s systems 
and history of breaches.  Regarding the company itself, pertinent 
data would include the industry, the volume of consumer data 
entrusted to the company, and the existence of any warranties 
concerning data security that may give rise to a contractual claim 
by consumers.  Regarding the particular breach in question, the 
survey would ask how many consumers were impacted, what 
kind of data was stolen—in the form of “check all that  
apply”—and was the stolen data encrypted? 
With respect to security systems, companies would be asked 
to describe the security measures currently in place to protect 
against a data breach, and to detail how much the company has 
paid to date to implement and maintain its current data security 
scheme.  Such an accounting would include, for example, the 
initial cost of installation of any programs, annual maintenance 
costs, and labor or outside services costs associated with 
maintaining and monitoring data security.  While this may seem 
like a lot of information to ask of a company, consider that a 
company need only collect the information once.  It could then 
resubmit the same portion of the form for any subsequent 
breaches that may occur, merely adjusting for any system 
updates made since the last breach. 
Lastly, with respect to a company’s history of breaches, it 
would be asked whether any other breaches had occurred over 
the past five years and, if so, to provide the dates of each and the 
 
129 The benefit of precluding discovery before a court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction—including standing—has been established is that it “protects both 
plaintiff and defendant from burdensome and unnecessary discovery at a premature 
stage of the proceedings.” Motions to Dismiss, 7 Cyc. of Federal Proc. § 25:11 (3d ed.). 
The goal of a standardized form designed to address standing inquiries is to open the 
door to discovery just far enough to avoid a heavy burden. 
130 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Conference of the Parties; Planning for Discovery); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (Scheduling Orders). 
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number of consumers impacted.  The purpose here would be to 
determine if a substantially similar breach has occurred—that is, 
one involving the same defendant, timing, and security 
measures, or lack thereof—and to gauge the company’s response.  
In other words, did the company implement any upgrades or 
alterations to mitigate system vulnerability?  After obtaining 
responses from the breached company, consumer plaintiffs would 
submit the results of limited discovery to the court, along with 
information about their experience—specifically, the existence of 
any offer by the company to provide credit monitoring and the 
amount of mitigation costs expended by all parties. 
After the information is submitted, the court must confront 
the dilemma of evaluating the substantiality of the risk to 
consumers.  Under the proposed framework, a court would 
conduct a balancing test between the magnitude and likelihood of 
harm to the consumer and the precautions taken by the breached 
company—does it make sense to hold the company liable above 
and beyond what it has already paid to prevent such an 
occurrence?  The balancing test can be likened to the famous 
“Hand Formula” for determining liability in a negligence  
action: B=PL, where B=burden, or the investment in precaution, 
P=probability of harm, and L=loss, or the magnitude of harm.131  
According to the formula, liability—or in this situation, 
standing—“depends on whether B is less than L multiplied by 
P.”132  Put another way, individual data breach cases can be 
broken up into four quadrants, similar to the well-known 
impact/effort matrix used to prioritize tasks,133 but with the 
consumer’s likely harm (PL) on one axis and the company’s 
 
131 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
132 Id. 
Though mathematical in form, the Hand formula does not yield 
mathematically precise results in practice; that would require that B, P, 
and L all be quantified, which so far as we know has never been done in an 
actual lawsuit. Nevertheless, the formula is a valuable aid to clear thinking 
about the [relevant] factors . . . and about the relationship among those 
factors. 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982). 
133 See Allen Graves, Effort/Impact Matrix, SIX SIGMA DAILY (Jan. 4, 2013), 
https://www.sixsigmadaily.com/effort-impact-matrix/. The matrix involves plotting 
potential actions on a chart with effort on one axis and impact on the other. This 
allows for the identification of so-called low hanging fruit, “which of the numerous 
solutions to implement appear to be the easiest (least effort) while having the most 
favorable impact.” Id. Those tasks or solutions in the quadrant of low-effort, 
high-impact are implemented first. 
484 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:461   
prevention efforts (B) on the other, as illustrated in Figure 1 
below.  Applying such a concept in this context puts emphasis on 
the standing prongs of both injury-in-fact and causation. 
FIGURE 1: FACTUAL QUADRANT MODEL FOR  
CONSUMER STANDING  
 
 
In the absence of evidence of actual injury by the plaintiff, 
standing would be found only in the first quadrant.  The issue 
then becomes how to determine which quadrant a particular case 
falls into.  As a purely mathematical formula is impractical, the 
court would consider certain factors to determine where along 
the spectrum of each axis a case would fall. 
Along the injury axis, the type of data compromised is a 
critical factor to consider.  Full social security numbers and 
credit card numbers—especially both—would increase the risk 
and magnitude of harm to consumers, since these forms of data 
can easily be used to effectuate identity theft.  The last four 
digits of social security numbers or credit card numbers, or 
encrypted data, by contrast, would not hold as much weight.  
Another factor to consider would be the harm to others impacted 
by the same breach.  Since many breaches result in no identity 
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theft or fraudulent charges, the presence of another consumer 
who suffered actual injury speaks to the malicious intent of the 
hackers and, thus, the probability that they will engage in 
further malicious behavior.  While courts have expressed 
disapproval of the use of general statistics,134 limiting the 
analysis to the statistics of the same breach addresses this 
concern. 
Along the burden axis, the effort and cost associated with a 
company’s current security measures are the clearest indicator of 
the burden on the company.  This must be evaluated in light of 
the type of industry in which the company operates and the 
volume and types of customer data it safeguards.  The goal here 
is to incentivize companies to expend an appropriate amount on 
precautionary measures to protect their customers from breaches 
and to protect themselves from future litigation.  A company 
would have the ability, by making the necessary efforts toward 
preventing a breach, to place itself squarely in the two 
quadrants—two and four above135—where it could never be 
subject to suit in the absence of actual injury, in the form of 
identity theft or fraudulent charges.  A company’s offer to pay for 
credit monitoring would also be taken into account—not as an 
indicator of the likelihood of harm—but as evidence of the 
company’s attempt to take some of the burden off of consumers.  
If a company had experienced data breaches in the past, its 
response—namely, whether it made changes to its systems to 
avoid recurrence—would speak to its accountability for future 
breaches. 
CONCLUSION 
“[N]ow more than ever it’s important for organizations of all 
sizes to not only be prepared for a data breach, but to also be 
taking proactive steps to plan for the inevitability.”136  In light of 
the ever-increasing prevalence of data breaches, it is critical to 
identify a consistent method for analyzing risk for purposes of 
 
134 The Beck court, for example, rejected the idea that a “substantial risk” of 
harm could be inferred through statistics—for example, that data breach victims are 
9.5 times more likely to suffer identity theft and that 19% of data breach victims 
become victims of identity theft—explaining that a general statistic fails to address 
“the risk arising out of any particular incident, nor does it address the particular 
facts of this case.” Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 n.7 (4th Cir. 2017). 
135 See supra Figure 1. 
136 ITRC Data Breach Report, supra note 10, at 3 (quoting Matt Cullina, CEO of 
CyberScout). 
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standing.  Not only should consumers be aided in their decisions 
whether or not to file suit, but companies should be able to rely 
on the predictability of the courts’ decision-making in order to 
properly shield themselves from litigation.  The methodology 
discussed above represents a starting point for such evaluation.  
It would also have the added benefit of creating a standard 
method of data collection to improve our understanding of which 
factors in a data breach most often lead to identity theft or 
fraudulent charges to consumers. 
 
